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Education and debate 
Rethinking transparency and accountability in medicines 
regulation in the United Kingdom 
John Abraham, Julie Sheppard, Tim Reed 
As the Labour government in the United Kingdom 
introduces its plans for British freedom of information 
legislation in a white paper, it is important to consider 
the issues raised by this for the regulation of medicines. 
In the United Kingdom, the regulation of medicines is 
governed currently by the 1911 Official Secrets Act 
and 1968 Medicines Act These require all information 
on drug product licence applications to be treated with 
the utmost secrecy by the Department of Health's 
regulatory authority, the Medicines Control Agency, 
and all its 
expert advisory committees. Until May 1997, 
the official position of the British government was that 
confidentiality about regulation of medicines was 
needed to protect drug companies' commercially sen 
sitive trade secrets so that the pharmaceutical industry 
continued to invest and to make medicines available in 
the United Kingdom.1 
Open government? 
The 
existing secrecy sits uneasily with the rhetoric of 
the Conservative government's 1993 white paper on 
open government, which espoused the following 
principles: 
Open government is part of an effective democracy. 
Citizens must have adequate access to the information 
and analysis on which government business is based. 
Ministers and public servants have a duty to explain 
their policies to the public... .The Government 
believes that people should have the freedom to make 
their own choices on the important matters which 
affect their lives. Information is a condition of choice 
and provides a measure of quality... .The provision of 
full, accurate information in plain language about pub 
lic services, what they cost, who is in charge and what 
standards they offer is a fundamental principle of the 
Citizen's Charter. 
Ironically, this white paper was published in the 
same year that the Department of Health refused to 
support the Medicines Information Bill, which had the 
backing of the British Medical Association and the 
Patients' Association. That bill 
sought to establish pub 
lic access to data on: 
Why drug product licenses are approved, revoked, 
or withdrawn 
Expert scientific advice given to the Department of 
Health 
Broader concerns about the quality, safety, and effi 
cacy of medicines, subject to ministerial approval.2 
The pharmaceutical industry opposed the bill, 
arguing that the wider rights of public access to data 
could contravene European Union legislation on intel 
lectual property rights.3 The Department of Health 
subsequently adopted the industry's perspective by 
refusing to support the bill because it would have put 
the United Kingdom out of step with the rest of the 
European Union.4 
5 
Summary points 
Proposals for freedom of information legislation 
in the United Kingdom raise issues for regulation 
of medicines 
Under current law all information on 
applications 
for licences of drug products is treated with 
utmost secrecy 
Medicines 
regulators and their expert advisors are 
closely identified with the interests of the 
pharmaceutical industry in Britain 
Existing secrecy may not protect public health 
If legislation includes a "harm test" the 
commercial interests of pharmaceutical 
companies may take priority over providing the 
public with adequate information 
Divided loyalties 
The close identification of 
regulators and their expert 
advisers with the interests of the pharmaceutical indus 
try is evident in other respects. In 1984, the head of the 
British medicines 
regulatory authority returned to 
industry as director of the Association of the British 
Pharmaceutical Industry. He revealed that all his depu 
ties, principal medical officers, and superintendent 
pharmacists at the Department of Health had come 
from industry and that many returned to industry after 
working as regulators.6 
7 
Moreover, in 1989, only a fifth 
of the expert advisers on the Committee on Safety of 
Medicines or the Medicines Commission had neither 
personal nor non-personal financial interests in the 
industry.8 In 1996, the figure remained as low as a 
quarter (table). Of the 23 members of the Committee 
on Safety of Medicines with financial interests in 1996, 
three had interests in at least 20 companies, seven had 
interests in at least 10 
companies, and 20 members had 
interests in at least five 
companies.9 
Harm test 
New Labour's white paper promises to release more 
information about medicines 
regulation. However, it 
also implies that there will be a "harm test" for dis 
closure of information "which could affect share 
prices" of pharmaceutical companies. If such a test 
becomes law, the commercial interests of pharmaceu 
tical 
companies might take priority over the provision 
of adequate information to the public. Indeed, the 
Medicines Control Agency intends to consult with 
industry about what information might be exempted 
on the grounds of harm to pharmaceutical firms. 
Therein lies the reason for 
reducing the presence of 
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Industrial interests of expert scientific advisers on medicines regulation in 1989 and 19969 
No of advisers Personal interests* Non-personal interests! No interests 
Regulatory body_1989 1996_1989_1996_1989_1996_1989 1996 
Medicines Commission 24 19 17 11 7 7 56 
Committee on Safety of Medicines 21 29 14 8 15 22 6 
Total 45 48 31 29 22 29 9 12~~ 
*Defined as consultancies, fee paid work, and shareholding. 
fDefined as payments that benefit the department for which member is responsible but are not received by member personally. 
industrial interests within the 
regulatory process and 
increasing the presence of wider public health 
interests. 
Risky omissions 
The 
marketing of a-number of drugs that have been 
withdrawn because their risks 
outweighed their benefit 
would probably have been challenged earlier if there 
had been greater transparency and public accountabil 
ity.10 Only a few examples can be mentioned here. In 
the case of Opren, the lack of experimental testing for 
photosensitivity before approval in the United 
Kingdom and the omission of clear estimates of risks 
of photosensitivity from the United Kingdom product 
data sheet 
might well have been questioned.10 
Hundreds of patients who had taken Opren subse 
quently complained of persistent photosensitivity. 
Similarly, Zomax was approved in the United Kingdom 
?j Plans for British freedom of 
information raise issues for the 
regulation of medicines 
for the chronic treatment of arthritis without any 
warning on the product data sheet, despite positive 
carcinogenicity findings in animal tests before market 
ing. After the drug had been withdrawn, the Medicines 
Commission described the findings on carcinogenicity 
as a cause for concern when justifying its recommen 
dation that Zomax should not be returned to the mar 
ket. Had those findings been public before the drug 
had been 
approved, fewer patients would probably 
have been prescribed Zomax.10 More recently, Halcion 
was finally banned in the United Kingdom in 1993. It 
had been approved in 1978, but suspended since 1991. 
On banning Halcion, the British regulatory authorities 
said that if they had known in 1978 what they knew in 
1991, they would never have approved the drug in the 
first place. However, with greater transparency the 
regulatory authorities might have been warned sooner 
by the wider medical community of potential problems 
with the quality of Halcion data, in terms of inadequate 
summaries and disqualified investigators." 
An 
opportunity to lead 
Our focus on the United Kingdom freedom of 
information white paper does not imply that the 
context of the European Union should be ignored, but 
we should not use a desire to stay in line with Europe as 
an excuse for 
adopting the lowest common denomina 
tor of openness. Rather, the British regulatory authori 
ties should take the opportunity in forthcoming 
legislation to show leadership in Europe with regard to 
transparency and democratic accountability of medi 
cines control. 
More 
specifically, there should be public rights of 
access to all biochemical, clinical, pharmacological, 
statistical, and toxicological assessment reports by regu 
lators, as well as to transcripts of expert advisory 
meetings, including appeals procedures. Clinical data 
supporting the labelling for a medicine (that is, the sum 
mary of product characteristics) should also be available 
for public inspection. The identities of individual 
patients should be kept confidential, and companies' 
intellectual property rights could extend to confiden 
tiality for manufacturing techniques and formulation 
technology. However, the fact that pharmaceutical com 
panies do not trust each other not to use data unscrupu 
lously should not override the need of health 
professionals, patients, and the wider medical commu 
nity for adequate information about medicines safety 
and effectiveness. Furthermore, the negative impact on 
pharmaceutical companies of greater freedom of infor 
mation is often overstated. The American practices of 
releasing the internal scientific reviews by regulators and 
holding expert advisory committee meetings in public 
does not prevent its pharmaceutical industry from being 
the most prosperous in the world. 
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Endpiece 
Useful remedy 
In cases where patients are distressed and ill, and 
want to hang themselves, administer mandragora 
root to drink in the 
morning, in a smaller dose 
than would cause delirium. 
Hippocrates, Places in Man, edited and translated by 
Elizabeth M Craik, 1998 
Submitted by Ann Dally, Wellcome Institute for the 
History of Medicine 
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